When “political parties are more reluctant than ever to cooperate for good of country”, in this case Ytterberg writes: “It is hard to see that future of Spain is not black. "
The Swedish diplomat cannot be accused of exaggerating his judgment of Spanish political realities in light of subsequent events that have become clearer. analysis of situation is very different from one Spaniard to another.
According to some, a split between radicals and state could pave way for a military dictatorship. Others say there will be a period of social peace now that Spain has gotten rid of revolutionaries, and Danielson thinks it's too early to predict what will happen.
In end, everything returned to normal, but there was a tense atmosphere in ministerial circles, as militants, together with President of Republic, fought with compassion against Acting. mercy.
The revolution cost huge material and human lives and "interesting details", all politicians in San Sebastian Treaty 1930. The revolutionary committees that were part of republic, with exception of Leiro, were less involved in revolutionary movement, and Pieno, in addition, declared that he was fully responsible for revolution.
The question of conviction of Teodomiro Menendez and Ramon González Peña will be dealt with in detail by Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highest executive at level of minister himself: Rikard Sandler, who articulated Sweden's concerns to Spanish minister in Sweden, and Fiskovich hired Sandler 16 times. Interview.
1934 and 1935, especially in connection with signing of trade agreements and foreign policy cooperation, Fiskovich told Swedish minister that, in his opinion, government would attract Swedish labor movement. two socialist deputies.
The events of October 1934 were described by Government of Republic in a pamphlet entitled October 1934, The Revolt of General Government. It was sent to all embassies and missions. with clear instructions to send him to respective governments, and finally mission sent him to Sweden February 13, 1935.
In addition, as we said earlier, Spanish Mission in Stockholm was responsible for keeping Swedish government informed about events in October. Among other things, I learned of news reports that we had seen Margaret Nelken make a particularly strenuous trip to Swedish capital in spring of 1935.
The Swedish government has also been informed of Count Romanos' analysis of October Revolution and its aftermath, as reported by Einar Ytterberg in private correspondence with Baron Baker-Fries Swedish diplomat considered Romanos's statement "clear and reasonable" and paid particular attention to foreign interference in affairs of Asturias.
Romanones's views are "consistent with those of any impartial observer" as there is a lot of absolutist propaganda in Spain. Finally, although there are no official sources, other details about revolution in Asturias have found their way into Archives of Swedish Labor Movement in Stockholm, which contains many documents about whose history little is known so far.
It contains an extensive exhibition on Asturian Revolution written by Augustin Susi on links between Swedish Anarcho-Syndicalists and Spain, and within framework of the analysis a more detailed examination of these documents can be made.
But we can conclude that Swedish diplomat, who sought to understand as fully as possible revolutionary attempts in Spain, showed a unique sensitivity in analyzing a delicate situation.
After October Revolution of 1934 question of suspension of status of Catalonia was considered by Swedish delegation as one of most difficult issues facing government of republic. So people of Catalonia clearly want widest possible autonomy.
On other hand, Le Roux government's decision to raise issue of constitutional reform was widely commented on by Swedish diplomats, who did not hesitate to regard Alcala Zamora's actions in proposing constitutional reform as a violation of constitution, because it was not he who should make proposal, but government or a quarter of a room.
While they acknowledged that many elements of Conservative government's plan could not be implemented without reform of constitutional text, which was "a product of passionate times in which country was living at time", he was again President, criticizing Swedish diplomacy in connection with government crisis that broke out at end of March 1935, for fact that this time he did not become leader of party that received most votes.
Regarding Jill Robles, Danielson mentioned what he heard from reliable sources: Alcala Zamora refused to accept Gil Robles as Secretary of War, according to Jill herself Robles. to president that he was going to be secretary of war, whether he agreed with it or not, because he had military on his side.
We don't know anything yet, other than fact that generals will meet in Madrid to discuss situation and, according to Gil Robles, it's time to establish a dictatorship in country of regime, and if president continues to refuse to accept him as secretary of war, he intends to put the military in power and dissolve courts.
This situation is worrisome as it could tire reaction of socialist and republican left in Spain.
This short-lived incarnation of government and a reshuffling of Jill Robles as Secretary of War is under close scrutiny by a mission that believes it is only a matter of time before he becomes Chief of Cabinet, Jill Robles (Gil Robles) has de facto power.
Danielsson called it "one of usual surprises in Spanish politics" when Gil Robles and Le Roux quarreled over a commutation of what he thought was irreversible.
Government measures to combat unemployment and administrative reforms were presented in Swedish Chancellery as partial achievements, and similarly, according to Embassy, the main reason for fall of Le Roux's government was abdication of throne on September 1935< /strong > In a cabinet chaired by Haquin Chapaprita, it is a division within government coalition on Catalonia, constitutional reform and economic policy to be implemented.
From December 1935 attention of Swedish delegation, as well as whole country, will be focused on elections to court in February 1936, this is one of special problems of Swedish diplomacy.
Analysis of Swedish diplomacy in biennium of Second Spanish Republic generally coincides with vision of lack of institutional unity and political instability, which, according to Octavio Ruiz-Manjon, leads to Project of Political Modernization, which means that Spanish Second Republic can be considered touched by death from autumn 1933.
During Second Spanish Republic, what was biggest concern for Swedish diplomacy in Spain? The answer is clear. First, they were concerned about progress of communism in Spain and Spain's relations with Soviet Union, and second, they were equally concerned about future of Spanish democracy, worrying about dangers of civil war and > military dictatorship.
The Swedish mission has expressed concern about progress made since establishment of republic. Ivan Danielsson is also a Swedish government minister. Although he mostly lives in Spain, he maintains close contact with Swedish Consul General in Lisbon.
Norwegian Simon Hansen, who told Danielsson that Portuguese authorities are concerned about Spanish Republic's statement, according to Hansen, UK discussed with Portugal >Portugal may invade Spain by force if Spain is threatened by Islam.
If Spain politically slides in other direction, it will remain passive. On other hand, he writes, logically the leaders of Portuguese dictatorship should feel uneasy about Spain's declaration of a republic.
April 14, 1931 Danielson conducted his first interview with Niceto Alcalá Zamora and asked about dangers of other doctrines, as Minister of State said. As he did, Alejandro Rollero, Alcalá Zamora confirmed to him that he did not believe that Spain was threatened by "threat of Bolshevization".
Since Social Democrats have always been a strong bulwark against any attempt to introduce Soviet methods into country, Danielson was not entirely convinced by these arguments. Two days later, he concealed from government that he had been appointed "the most suffering man in Liberal Party".
If Spain was threatened by Sovietism, he believed that Great Britain would intervene, and as for France and Italy, they could not stand idle with appearance of Soviet puppet states in southwest. He hopes figures provided by Swedish Consul General in Lisbon confirm UK's fears of such a scenario.
In this connection, it is interesting to note message sent by Swedish Ambassador in London to Stockholm Foreign Office in spring of 1931. The British statesman Ramsay Macdonald informed ambassador that he had received information from Spain about intensification of absolutist propaganda.
Macdonald believed that process of creating a republic was not yet complete, and much could happen before Spain achieved real stability. Later, Perez de Ayala assured Swedish ambassador that "Bolshevism" was not in danger of gaining a foothold in Spain.
The equal work of Germans and Bolsheviks in Morocco is noteworthy. Around same time, Danielson sent a report on relationship of Spanish Republic to Soviet Union. In letter, he said a new wave is brewing, with left-wing media calling for country's immediate recognition, a measure that was supported by several members of interim government.
However, Le Roux told Danielson that government might not have time to immediately deal with issue of recognizing USSR, since government first had to resolve many domestic political issues, although Danielson considered issue urgent, and Trotsky had addressed issue to Spain. The Republican government applied for permission to trip to Spain.
The media initially suggested that he might be allowed to enter Spain, and although it was later assumed that Trotsky would have difficulty obtaining necessary permits to transit from Istanbul to various parts of Spain, Spanish government decided wait, question of possible approval of Trotsky in Spain and recognition of USSR as a republic was to be discussed by government elected by Constituent Assembly.
In summer of 1931 Danielsson again mentioned Spanish-Soviet relations. The Spanish government decided to start negotiations on establishing trade relations with Soviet Union. The Government reported Indalecio Prieto Statement that doctrine in Spain was not dangerous and that Soviet Union was wrong to want Spain to become a new testing ground.
The USSR had too many internal problems to chase after an international complication of this magnitude, and everything seemed to indicate that Spain did not have diplomatic relations with United States, and in any case we had to rely on both sides, and this was It would take quite some time until he starts to calm down.
The worst and more enduring "class hatred" arose from a deadly struggle between working class and rest of society.
He then elaborated on reasons for confrontation between Catalonia and Madrid, referring to unity policy of monarchy and anti-Catalan policy of republican right wing, when Catalonia announced creation of a republic within Federal Republic of Spain, he arrested leaders of government and Asanya himself.
But it seems that this prevented coup plans, and uprising was drowned in blood, which is difficult to predict. So it doesn't look like alliance between activists and CEDAW will last long. In particular, progress of reactionary stance within official ranks of Spanish army has always been aimed at "the temptation to resort to a coup d'état".
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