December 1931, Spanish Republic didn't want conflict with Argentina and other South American countries, they were very against strong>Soviet Union , Leroux did same in an interview in Paris.
The Leroux Mission sent out a confidential letter between Ivan Danielsson and Spanish Minister of State Luis de Zulueta) previous Christmas Eve.
They were talking about Conference on Disarmament and Zulueta said that Spanish government had no opinion, although he agreed with current process and did not want any delay, because republic is fully in favor of disarmament, insisting on world, they touched on a topic of concern after establishment of communism as a goal of Spanish foreign policy.
Zuluetta talked about Soviet Union and was very interested in details of Sweden's relations with Soviet Union, especially Sweden's policy against Bolshevik propaganda. It seems to me that Zuluetta was personally not interested in helping to establish diplomatic relations with USSR as soon as possible, which could be connected with experience of his predecessor when meeting with Litvinov in Geneva.
At time, Spaniards expressed Spain's interest in opening Russian market for Spanish wine and fruit as an addition to purchase of Russian fuel, so Litvinov did not accept his offer,Litvinov said him that Spanish goods are luxury items banned in Soviet Union.
January 1932 After "bloody" clashes between workers and security forces, Danielsson told Stockholm that Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister had assured him: "These ongoing clashes with security forces security are part of trade union policy pursued by Soviet Union.
Through successive operations against law enforcement officers across country, he tried to create chaos in country and make it more receptive to doctrine of unionism, notable for fact that several representatives of court were directly involved in attack on existing legal order.
Given efforts of Spanish Republican leaders to represent Western democracies diplomatically, as Danielson's previous reports had shown, to see that Spain was not in danger of moving closer to Soviet communism, Swedish diplomats, however, came to following conclusion: they would hardly have dared to so accurately name their sources without secrecy.
The difference lies in self-accuracy or inaccuracy, which is same thing in itself, and Swedish Minister Plenipotentiary in Madrid believes that it is very important to make an immediate contribution to Scandinavian provided by Asian government.
Shortly after government took control of "trade union revolution to establish dictatorship of proletariat", Danielson pointed out that, according to information provided by Spanish media, foreign intervention was suppressed, according to Casares himself . As for other reports, government's hints that monarchs are supporting union unrest, Danielson finds them less credible.
Danielsen immediately took up his pen and informed Swedish Consul General in Madrid in confidence in front of his government. Businessman Luis de la Peña assured that new attempts were allegedly being made in government circles to overthrow trade union movement. , Republican regime, and "strong" government was largely responsible for public unrest for not acting tough enough against revolutionaries.
As Mandela said, most of rioters fled at behest of government. The report on Soviet Union says: "The government's ambiguity is all more puzzling as it has credible evidence that Soviet Union played an active role in preparing recent revolutionary movement."
Government Minister Casares personally told Consul General De la Peña that Trotsky could try to reinstate himself behind this. The distribution of Russian gold and weapons in country in eyes of believers, and Trotsky knew very well conditions in Spain, and what he knew about them when he visited Spain before.
As evidence of union activity, he finally mentions Consul General de Peña in Madrid, near consulate, where surveys of residents showed that each of 30 villagers received pistols . and 250 pesetas to join a local trade union.
It is interesting that this information comes from someone very close to leader and seems to us symptomatic of circumstances in which Swedish diplomats found themselves. At same time, Danielson was very careful not to believe words of Consul General, which was repeatedly said in the office.
Again question arises: is this purely false information not accidental on part of Consul General of Sweden in Madrid? In other words, are there grounds for blaming an authoritarian state?
In this regard, information sent by Swedish embassy in Moscow in April of same year is very interesting. In fact, already in February 1932, leaders had problems with Comintern and were accused of incompetence, even of sectarianism.
Anyway, fact is that information about Russian gold in Spain reached head of democratic Swedish foreign policy through official custodial channels, and here is his diplomatic explanation for January 1932 riots: "A year after declaration of republic, Swedish embassy is concerned about progress, and a return to monarchy is no longer conceivable."
And after establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Union in July 1933, Danielson said that after Pascha refused to accept post of ambassador to Moscow, Soviet Union asked to approve appointment authority, because . Danielson knew he was dissatisfied with some members of government because of candidate's "excessive sympathy" for Soviet Union.
The question of relations with Soviet Union again became subject of Ivan Danielson's conversations with new Spanish Minister of State, Sanchez Albornoz, in October 1933, making it clear to him that Spain was in no hurry to exchange ambassadors, since initially a chargé d'affaires could only be sent to Moscow because Soviet ambassador Luna Chetevsky was seriously ill in Paris.
Danielsson concluded that Spain would prefer to wait until its trade relations with country were settled before appointing an ambassador in Moscow, that is, until Spanish exports to Soviet Union partially offset Spain's oil imports from Russia.
During an interview on December 30, 1933, Danielsson revisited Spanish-Soviet relations with new Minister of State, as well as pi with Ta and Romero, intending to follow example of his predecessor, Danielsson came to conclusion that there was an immediate danger of exporting Swedish timber, competing with Russia, to Spain.
As you can see, Sweden's interest in Spanish-Russian relations is not only political, but also commercial.
Although we have already mentioned October Revolution of 1934 and how it was covered by Swedish legation in Madrid, here we would like to add that October 1934 in April , Swedish Navy General Staff has collected information on following issues.
International impact of revolution and possible intervention, is there red propaganda in Spanish army, if yes, then you need to understand what measures they took on this issue, and finally, to answer Swedish petition, based on from lessons of these events, requested information from State and Military Ministry of Spain.
Sukia and Hungarian diplomatic representatives, who pay special attention to maintaining their international dossiers of political and social agitators, have an urgent interest in this sector, nominal foreigners of any country whose intervention in recent revolutions has been observed. As a preparation and in - a performing exercise.
This is another fact of attitude of Swedish Social Democratic Party towards communism, which was also common to countries of Northern Europe, and during war years Isabelle de Palencia determined powers of ministers. Spanish Republic.
1935 Spain faced danger of fascism or military dictatorship, as Swedish diplomats in Madrid discovered with unique insight that question of progress of ism was only circumstantial. reappear when it comes to political situation.
In spring of 1936, when Swedish delegation even started talking about "Spanish Bolshevization project", specific concerns about ideology grew into broader concerns about Spanish democracy and imminent risk of civil war.
Elections in February 1936, an important milestone in history of Spain, and hence analysis of Swedish legation in Madrid, which thereafter seems to have focused almost exclusively on them. Consider a critical situation. for future of Spanish democracy.
Ivan Danielson describes situation on eve of general elections in Spain, deeply concerned about possible consequences of "seriousness" of situation due to political instability and a government crisis caused by resignation of Chapa Preta strong>and "threats" By end of 1935 formation of Left Popular Front was inevitable, and after new head of government they wanted to build a great >Center Party.
Danielson believes his proposal could succeed given that it has support of various provincial governors who are "like in Spain" openly critical of Qaysism and vote-rigging and very concerned about it. It was clear to Swedish diplomat that real fight would be between United Right and Alliance of Left.
Danielson's pessimistic outlook revealed his doubts about republic's longevity, writing thatelections may not take place because current complications could cast doubt on very existence of current regime.
Given that latest governmental crisis is 28 chaos in four and a half years of Spanish Republic, enemies of Republic say that current system of government is not stable enough to be called that, which is not entirely correct .
There is no doubt that in Madrid Swedish Minister Plenipotentiary has complications in mind: possibility of a coup d'état and a military dictatorship. In fact, in last days of December, Jill Robles' interview with army was reported in which he made it clear: At War Department, I was pressured by generals to declare that as a retired soldier, a military-backed dictatorship should. "
Danielsson once again criticized actions of President of Republic regarding formation of second cabinet of Portela December 30 in order to protect his political interests, giving priority to his constitutional functions as head of state , at same time he hinted at his disapproval of fact that government is "non-parliamentary" and is a tool in hands of Alcalá Zamora.
The Swedish diplomat also attacked Lago Kavalera for saying that extremists do not respect democracy because he is determined not to accept election results and is ready to seize power in a revolutionary way.
January 1936 Not believing in possibility of a Center Party, Danielson subscribed to right-wing slogan that elections are referendums "for or against revolution and Marxism" from "Judging by passion already expressed in election rallies”, agitation will be violent.
Danielsson reported that elections were held in a normal and good order, without violence, attributing wide victory of Popular Front to change in political position of broad Spanish electorate, whose support of "former dictator Primo del Rey" Fascist movement founded by "Sons of Villa" takes a clear position and believes that Spain's policy will change significantly.
Danielsson wants Azania to make a deal with Jill Robles to eliminate danger of "bilateral extremism" and highlights implications of this for financial world. The monarchy is worried about persecution in Catalonia like 1931, as he lists composition of new government and reduces number of ministries.
This reflects people's enthusiasm for Azania's takeover and clearly describes right-wing parties' disappointment with result. Danielsson also stressed danger of electoral fraud in areas where elections are about to be repeated, stating: "Knowing ordinary approach to elections in this country, government should not miss opportunity to further increase number of courts."
He announced formation of Popular Front and was afraid to comment on election results, although he considered position of Alcala Zamora "unsustainable for victory of either right-wing coalition or Marxist Front."
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